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Wednesday, August 12, 2026

The line that must not be crossed: The nuclear temptation

By Dejan Hinic and Gabriƫl Moens

Not often is a book published when it is most needed. Such a book is Nuclear War: A Scenario authored by Annie Jacobsen and published in 2024. In her book, Jacobsen, a Pulitzer Prize-nominated journalist, recounts the consequences of a hypothetical first strike by North Korea against the United States, thereby engulfing the World in a nuclear Armageddon. The publication of the book is timely considering that the world is experiencing heightened anxiety about the use of nuclear weapons. Its chilling message is reverberating around the World because it warns about the fatal consequences of the use of these weapons for mankind.

In her book, Jacobsen emphasises that nuclear conflict is not a series of controlled detonations but a cascading failure of systems, communications, and human judgment. She writes that nuclear war is ā€œa sequence of events that, once initiated, becomes almost impossible to stop.ā€[1] Her analysis underscores the core danger: nuclear weapons are not tools of precision; they are catalysts of chaos. This is true, taking into consideration that there are over twelve thousand nuclear warheads, of which the United States. and Russia have approximately five thousand each. This means that there are more warheads than potential targets.

The World has once again embraced the language of nuclear threats, a dialect humanity vowed never to use again after the mushroom clouds of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As tensions between the United States and Iran escalate following the failure of the recently signed MOU, reports have emerged that Washington might consider tactical nuclear strikes against hardened Iranian facilities. What was once unthinkable is now discussed in policy circles, cable news studios, and military analysis forums. This is not merely another Middle Eastern crisis. It is a moment when the nuclear taboo, one of the last remaining pillars of global restraint, is being tested. And it must not be allowed to crack.

Of course, the temptation to use nuclear weapons is understandable. Iran’s remaining nuclear sites are deeply underground in mountainous regions, heavily fortified, and difficult to destroy with conventional weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons, smaller, lower‑yield devices designed for battlefield use, could theoretically eliminate these facilities with minimal collateral damage. But this logic is seductive precisely because it is dangerous. Nikita Khrushchev, who understood nuclear brinkmanship better than most, once warned: ā€œThe survivors would envy the dead.ā€[2] He was not speaking about civilians alone. He meant civilisation itself because the political, economic, and moral fabric that holds the World together would be destroyed, even to the extent that survivors would envy the dead. Even a ā€œsmallā€ nuclear weapon tears at that fabric.

Nuclear weapons exist for one reason: deterrence. Their purpose is to prevent future wars, not to fight them. The entire architecture of global nuclear stability, from the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction to modern strategic postures, rests on a simple truth: the value of nuclear weapons lies in their non‑use. Once a nuclear weapon is used, even tactically, that truth collapses.

A tactical nuclear weapon is not the monstrous city‑destroying weapon of Hiroshima or the multi‑megaton warheads of the Cold War. It is a lower‑yield device, sometimes as small as a fraction of a kiloton, designed to destroy hardened bunkers, underground facilities, military formations, or command centres.

They are marketed, dangerously, as ā€œcleaner,ā€ ā€œmore precise,ā€ and ā€œmore usable.ā€ But this is a myth. Even the smallest nuclear detonation produces radioactive fallout, long‑term environmental damage, unpredictable blast effects, and political shockwaves far larger than the physical ones. A tactical nuclear weapon is still a nuclear weapon. And once the nuclear threshold is crossed, it cannot be uncrossed.

Jacobsen’s research makes clear that even a single nuclear detonation, tactical or otherwise, triggers global panic, misinterpretation, and retaliatory posturing. The idea that nuclear use can be contained is a fantasy. Once the first link is broken, the rest follow. A tactical nuclear strike in Iran could trigger misinterpretation in Moscow, panic in Beijing, opportunism in Islamabad, and fear in Tel Aviv. The nuclear taboo is humanity’s last firewall. It is thin. It is fragile. And it is all we have.

If the United States were to use a nuclear weapon, even a small one, and even targeted at a military facility, even deep underground, it would rewrite the rules of global conflict. Russia would claim justification for nuclear use in its ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Moscow already threatens nuclear escalation against the sponsors of Ukraine’s regime. Hence, a U.S. strike would hand the Kremlin a precedent for launching a nuclear weapon against its enemies. A broken taboo makes the unthinkable thinkable.

India and Pakistan would see nuclear use as a viable option. Their rivalry is one miscalculation away from catastrophe. With respect to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it would accelerate its nuclear expansion. Beijing would argue that the U.S. has normalised nuclear use and must be counterbalanced. And PRC has the means and resources to rapidly expand its nuclear arsenal. Iran’s proxies would escalate globally. A nuclear strike would not end Iran’s influence. It would ignite it.

As for non‑nuclear states, they would reconsider their security and approach to nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons are usable, then not having them becomes a strategic liability, risk, and weakness. The World would become more dangerous, not less. This would mean that, in addition to the current nine countries that have nuclear weapons, many more countries would aim to possess one or more of these weapons of destruction. This would result in a global arms race, involving multiple countries.

Even if the U.S. used a tactical nuclear weapon exclusively against a hardened military site, with no civilian casualties, the political fallout would be immense. Europe would erupt in protest. The Global South would condemn Washington as a rogue actor. The United Nations would convene emergency sessions. Allies would question American leadership. America’s adversaries would exploit the moment. The U.S. would win a strike but lose the World.

The moral cost would be even greater. Nuclear weapons are not simply destructive devices; they are symbols of humanity’s darkest potential. Their use, any use, signals that civilisation has failed to restrain its most catastrophic impulses.

The greatest threat is not the immediate blast and the damage caused by it. It is the normalisation of nuclear use. For 81 years, the World has lived under a fragile but essential assumption: nuclear weapons are not to be used. Break that assumption once, and every future conflict becomes a potential nuclear conflict. This was well understood during the Cuban Missile Crisis by President Kennedy and the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Kruschev, who both rationally assessed the calamity that the use of nuclear weapons would engender.

The United States is right to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. It is right to defend its interests and allies. It is right to deter aggression. But it must not cross the nuclear threshold. A tactical nuclear strike may appear precise, limited, and strategically effective. But, in reality, it would be a historic mistake that opens the door to a World where nuclear weapons become tools of coercion, punishment, and convenience.

Annie Jacobsen’s work reminds us of the fatal consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. It is a message that political leaders must understand. People must understand it too. Because in a World where nuclear weapons are used, even once, even ā€œtactically,ā€ the survivors, as Khrushchev warned, may indeed envy the dead.

Dejan Hinic is a financial and investment expert operating from Belgrade, Serbia He received his law degrees from the University of Belgrade and the University of Queensland.

GabriĆ«l Moens AM is an emeritus professor of law at the University of Queensland where he served as the Garrick Professor of Law. He also served as pro vice-chancellor and dean at Murdoch University. He is the co-author of The Legal Right to Disobey Law, Sidestream Press, 2026.


[1] Annie Jacobsen, Nuclear War: A Scenario. New York: Penguin Random House, 2024, Chapter 1.

[2] Available at: https://www.azquotes.com/author/7985-Nikita_Khrushchev.

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